The Hidden Hand: A Brief History of the CIA

This book would make a useful primer for anyone about to take a job with the CIA, or in any institution that has a working relationship with the CIA. At around 85,000 words, though, it is over-long for readers who just want a genuinely brief overview. At the same time, it is likely to fall short of the expectations of those looking for operational detail. The narrative is primarily focused on Washington DC and nearby Langley, Va., where the CIA has its headquarters; the politics of its direction; and the political impact of some of its 'estimates' and briefings, especially those prepared for the President, its 'first customer'.The time period covered extends from the CIA's establishment in 1947 to May 2013, four months into President Barack Obama's second term of office. As Obama began to set down policy for his second term, the CIA's brief - in the view of Immerman - was showing signs of turning full circle. The agency's original function was primarily to research, prepare and present intelligence briefings. Later it got into many nefarious activities of its own, some thoroughly unpleasant, several of which have become notorious. Since 2004, the agency has been operating armed drones. That activity, says Immerman, has put it at the center of secret American paramilitary operations. 'The post-9/11 CIA,' he writes, 'has become a killing machine.' In his closing pages, he anticipates that in future the killing will revert to being a function of the military, although probably only over a period of years.In general, Immerman is supportive of the CIA. He reports that after the Cuban Missile Crisis President Kennedy awarded it a 'very well done', and he protests on the CIA's behalf that its estimates in Johnson-era Vietnam were good; its problem was that, along with the President, it lost public and congressional support. The fall of the Berlin wall, he asserts, was 'accidental', so the CIA cannot be faulted for failing to anticipate it. As a careful reader at the time of daily newspapers, I cannot agree either that the fall of the wall was accidental, nor that it could not have been anticipated, at least not during the weeks between August and November 1989 in which East Germans had without hindrance been escaping to the West through Czechoslovakia and Hungary.Immerman does, however, heavily condemn the CIA for its part in construction of the false rationale for invading Iraq in 2003. Politicians in the United States and Britain believed what they wanted to believe about Saddam Hussein and his alleged weapons of mass destruction, persuading themselves of the weapons' and a nuclear program's existence in the face of evidence that was at best scant and unreliable. Rolling with the flow, the CIA withheld the testimony of the families of Iraqi scientists that Saddam's programs to produce WMD had ceased. Saddam did not in fact restart his nuclear program after its destruction in 1991, and the last Iraqi factory producing illicit weapons was closed in 1996. Furthermore, the CIA dismissed the judgment of both UN and American experts that the aluminum tubes discovered in Iraq were used for conventional rockets, permitted by the UN Security Council, not for centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium for nuclear weapons.Immerman believes the lessons of the Iraq fiasco (and of the converse failures of 9/11 and the 'Underpants Bomber' (December 2009), where dots that really did exist were not joined) have been learned, and systems and mindsets changed accordingly. We can certainly hope so.

Very unbiased.

Subtitled "A Brief History of the CIA" the brevity of Richard H. Immerman`s otherwise useful study rather undermines it.What Immerman has delivered here is very much an administrative history; as he states right from the first chapter - and repeats throughout the book - the Agency was originally formed with the purpose of gathering and analysing intelligence and that analysts are the backbone of the organisation; early on in it`s history due to the background of those appointed to run it, it became a more operations-based body than intended - very often paramilitary in nature. While Immerman frequently discusses these operations - especially those most well-known to the public, such as the Bay of Pigs, the Iran hostage crisis, operation Neptune Spear, etc., he doesn't go into a lot of detail about them; had he done so he would have lubricated the text a little more for the general reader - unless you have a familiarity with the ops. referred to, it remains rather dry. It isn't a case of leaving out the "juicy bits" of field-work - it would simply have provided a more rounded picture; Nor is there a clear description of just what intelligence analysis entails - is it statistics-based? An assembling of a jig-saw of secret information? An informed interpretation of information contained in foreign media? I suspect a mixture of all of these, but there isn't a complete case-history presented to provide the reader with this insight.Nevertheless, the book remains a fairly readable account; it does often become a listing of who-was-appointed-to-which-post, by whom and for what reason and it`s clear that different political administrations have treated the agency as something of a football due to mistrust, or have moulded it`s functions to their own ends. A glossary of acronyms would have been useful, as keeping track of different intelligence bodies and department heads can be confusing.I suspect that this will be a hard book to engage with for most casual readers; if you already have an interest in the CIA or are familiar with some of the operations through other books or narratives you may find it of real value, especially for research; it is short, but thorough enough given the limitations the author has set for it.Each chapter has proper reference notes and the book is indexed; there are some redactions in the text - blacked-out words or sentences; the author explains these in a note - it seems a bit silly, but that's the CIA for you... 3 ½ stars.

If your looking for who killed kennedy.....erm....look elsewherethis is a accademic text that is a primer concerning teh history of americas fray into a all round intel gathering organistaion. The americans never really had an organisation prior to WW2 which was tasked with doing the gathering of intel, unlike teh europeans who had been doing it for centuries. They had dabbled during WW1 but had stopped afterwards after it was described as ungentlemanly to read anotehr mans mail. They also entered the more paramilitary style version with the OSS during WW2 but that is a far cry from the reality of an true inteligence gathering organisation that the CIA was billed to be.Immerman basically sets out the time line, issues, actions and results, failures and successes of the CIA in short form. how it has always struggled between being a paramilitary and inteligence gathering and analysis organisation and which should take teh forefront. Also how its focus shifts with reaction to Director changes and political pressure.This isnt a all in history of teh CIA, more a start point that moves away from the expose type books, or this written with a axe to grind, or those looking at specific actiosn or eras. its a a bok to begin with if your delving into the realities of the issues faced by an intelligence organisation that is relativly young, the people and the scenarios involved.It is an easy read if you already have some knowledge of teh inteligence subject, hwoever if your new to it then the auther doesnt venture into describing some aspects he assumes you will know so its not for the total layman, however with teh internet close by it wont be a problem to follow with a little help.personaly I would read this and then move on to tim weiners history of the cia toe fill out your knowledge on the back of it.And then delve onwards from there. you can never know everything - otherwise what wuold be the point of being secret- but you will get a better idea of how it is supposed to work over how it does actually work and vice versa

This book would make a useful primer for anyone about to take a job with the CIA, or in any institution that has a working relationship with the CIA. At around 85,000 words, though, it is over-long for readers who just want a genuinely brief overview. At the same time, it is likely to fall short of the expectations of those looking for operational detail. The narrative is primarily focused on Washington DC and nearby Langley, Virginia, where the CIA has its headquarters; the politics of its direction; and the political impact of some of its 'estimates' and briefings, especially those prepared for the President, its 'first customer'.The time period covered extends from the CIA's establishment in 1947 to May 2013, four months into President Barack Obama's second term of office. As Obama began to set down policy for his second term, the CIA's brief - in the view of Immerman - was showing signs of turning full circle. The agency's original function was primarily to research, prepare and present intelligence briefings. Later it got into many nefarious activities of its own, some thoroughly unpleasant, several of which have become notorious. Since 2004, the agency has been operating armed drones. That activity, says Immerman, has put it at the centre of secret American paramilitary operations. 'The post-9/11 CIA,' he writes, 'has become a killing machine.' In his closing pages, he anticipates that in future the killing will revert to being a function of the military, although probably only over a period of years.In general, Immerman is supportive of the CIA. He reports that after the Cuban Missile Crisis President Kennedy awarded it a 'very well done', and he protests on the CIA's behalf that its estimates in Johnson-era Vietnam were good; its problem was that, along with the President, it lost public and congressional support. The fall of the Berlin wall, he asserts, was 'accidental', so the CIA cannot be faulted for failing to anticipate it. As a careful reader at the time of daily newspapers, I cannot agree either that the fall of the wall was accidental, nor that it could not have been anticipated, at least not during the weeks between August and November 1989 in which East Germans had without hindrance been escaping to the West through Czechoslovakia and Hungary.Immerman does, however, heavily condemn the CIA for its part in construction of the false rationale for invading Iraq in 2003. Politicians in the United States and Britain believed what they wanted to believe about Saddam Hussein and his alleged weapons of mass destruction, persuading themselves of the weapons' and a nuclear programme's existence in the face of evidence that was at best scant and unreliable. Rolling with the flow, the CIA withheld the testimony of the families of Iraqi scientists that Saddam's programmes to produce WMD had ceased. Saddam did not in fact restart his nuclear programme after its destruction in 1991, and the last Iraqi factory producing illicit weapons was closed in 1996. Furthermore, the CIA dismissed the judgement of both UN and American experts that the aluminium tubes discovered in Iraq were used for conventional rockets, permitted by the UN Security Council, not for centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium for nuclear weapons.Immerman believes the lessons of the Iraq fiasco (and of the converse failures of 9/11 and the 'Underpants Bomber' (December 2009), where dots that really did exist were not joined) have been learned, and systems and mindsets changed accordingly. We can certainly hope so.

A brief and succinct text, this – self confessed “Brief History of The CIA” - is a fascinating whistlestop tour of the past sixty seven years of the world's most well known and insidious intelligence body, even more than the KGB : the cover art details the obtuse Kryptos sculpture, which sits in the grounds of the CIA headquarters, and represents to all serious deciphers one of the greatest code challenges in history. Given his history with time spent inside the whale, Immerman details a brief overview of the CIA in a readable, but frustratingly brief manner. Even in this though – and as noted by a specialist note, chunks of text are redacted by a big black box, which stylistically works to remind us visually of the wealth of fact we mere mortals are deemed not important enough to know. As the book progresses to the modern age, these black boxes of secrecy become more prevalent : the last chapter averages a redaction every other page, for example. Although it reads like a somewhat complex spy thriller, which it undoubtedly is, “The Hidden Hand” is a breakneck race through seven decades of history at the cutting edge of secrecy and subterfuge.

As I have a life-long interest in "Intelligence" information, having begun with Ian Fleming, John Le Carré, Len Deighton et al, I thought that this book might give me an insight into the infamous Central Intelligence Agency; that it does, however, it has an awful lot of jargon, in particular a host of acronyms, which I found annoying. Usually I can read a book of this size in three sittings, but, as it is boring in many places, it took me about twenty eight days (or to be accurate - nights, as I read before going to sleep). I prefer books which hold my attention, this didn't. On the plus side, the redactions didn't impact on the information; and I learnt things which happened in the world that were unknown to 'the man in the street' - so it was useful in that respect. The author wrote the book like a text book (as we used to call books at school fifty-odd years ago), and he could have made it more readable if he had spiced up the various 'operations'.