Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects

I suspect Tool-Being was Harman's first attempt to reveal his developed ontology to the world. The book, written in 2002, is now a bit dated as Harman has updated his ontology with a few modifications (additions and subtractions) in later books, but those are still only adjustments around the edges. The basic ideas are all still here. What I do not see, again, is any development of his conclusions from first principles, but his ontology does not simply spring fully formed into his head. Rather than first principles it appears to have been a patchwork of inspiration taken from the ideas of Heidegger, Whitehead, Latour, and others. If anything Tool-Being provides us with this historical foundation of Harman's thought.So what we get here in this book is first a review of Heidegger's theory of tools and broken tools which forms the fundamental insight that Harman extends to everything, not just tools, in the universe. Next he looks into various interpretations of Heidegger and shows how they can be extended to be about more, and different, than Heidegger himself had in mind. Lastly, we have the explication of his own insights derived from the foregoing. All of this until the last 7 or 8 pages of the book is illustrated by reference to other philosophers, in the last chapter mostly Levinas and Zubri. Finally, at the end Harman states his conclusions and several problems (paradoxes and regresses) stemming from them. He recognizes that these issues must be worked through (presumably by him and others) to fully flesh out the ontology, but he declines to do this here claiming for this book only a pointer to the way forward.There is a good reason why Harman is grouped with a few others among the new generation of "speculative realists". Given their continental anti-realist roots (Meillassoux being the only other of this group I've reviewed) they accept that perception alone (naive realism) doesn't give us reality, and that, in the end, we can't do philosophy (or anything else) from outside the mind. What they have in common is the conviction that from within mind, we can say something reasonable about the layout of a reality that includes both mind and something outside it. But they also know that what might well be reasonable and even useful for other areas of philosophy and the human-sciences cannot be known to be true. At best, as concerns ontology, these ideas of Harman (and Meillassoux and others) are speculations. They are not inductive conclusions based on evidence, but speculative possibilities. Harman is at least aware that the summing up of his particular speculations, up through the development of his thought to this point, leaves many questions to be resolved. He finishes convinced that, as a beginning, the fleshed out [future] system will be useful to someone. I have to wonder if he doesn't come across a bit too convinced given the historical foundations of his ideas, but he does make a good effort in the last pages to explain his views particularly as they contrast with those of Heidegger and Whitehead.I gave the book 4 stars because even if one is not a fan of Harman, the book is a superb explication of Heidegger and others as concerns possible implications of their metaphysics, epistemology, and phenomenology to the nature of the mind independent world.

I don't normally write reviews at Amazon, but I was a bit shocked by the extreme (and undeserved) negativity of some of the reviews on this book, some of which seem to be inspired more by a glorification of Heidegger or by elitist motivations than by a good reading of the book. Apparently some readers are of the opinion that philosophy is only for those who enjoy(ed) a philosophical education. I find that view shortsighted.In my opinion the philosophical scheme that Harman begins(!) to outline in this book is refreshing and enriching. It is refreshing because it is a very clear example of a philosophy with the ambition not to put human experience of the world at center stage. However remarkable Heidegger's own philosophy is (which is clearly Harman's opinion), it is the way that Harman builds on these insights that make this book more than worthwhile to read. Don't read this book as a secondary source on Heidegger, but read it as a first introduction to Object Oriented Ontology (OOO). I also found the scheme enriching, because it made me think about my everyday affairs in a slightly different light; it added something to my mode of thinking.The book is accessible. I understand that there are risks in attempts to convey philosophical insights in everyday language, but wrapping insights in an arcane language doesn't make them more interesting by definition, and the use of a more accessible language doesn't make the insights conveyed less interesting by definition. I think that Harman demonstrates this.I won't give the book five stars, because it does indeed become rather repetitive at some points. The same central arguments are presented many times, but often in a slightly different light. Although the repetition serves the purpose of ingraining Harman's insights in the readers thoughts, Harman also risks losing the reader's attention now and then. I also felt that Harman could have stepped forward in his book a bit more. He often lets other writers speak for him, although Harman's own narrative voice is clearly there in the critical reflection on the works of these writers, gradually building his own scheme throughout it all.I liked this book a lot and I have already bought another of Harman's books. Don't be distracted by all those Heideggerian purists ;).

In this book Harman works out an exciting new approach to philosophy beginning from Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of the being of equipment. The being of equipment is ready-to-hand, involved with it's world, as contrasted with the prevailing modern sense of being as a meaningless presence-at-hand, worthy only for human use and retrospect interpretation.Harman praises Heidegger's phenomenological analysis here for opening a way beyond modern subject-centered thinking, but criticizes Heidegger for himself remaining too much caught up in Dasein -- his human 'being there' -- and not probing far enough into the contours of the things themselves as made available by the analysis of tool-being.By radicalizing this phenomenological approach to beings as concealed equipment, i.e. a back-ground of hidden beings which support and enable our own being-in-the-world, Harman points to an exciting new confrontation with the being of beings (their ultimate substantiality) which reveals their being packed full of references (meanings) in ways which modern subjective & linguistic human-centered thinking has 'lost touch with' and sealed itself off from.

I am not going to write much because this book doesn't even warrant thorough critique. Basically, Heidegger is the most important philosopher of the 20th century. He dedicated his life to powerful, serious thinking. If that is something you might be interested in, do not read this book. How sad it is to know that the author "teaches" impressionable students "philosophy." He writes in a way that only seventeen year olds could find compelling... but I suppose this is intentional as they are the only people who could take such rubbish seriously. My advice: STAY AWAY

I first read this whilst completing a masters dissertation on Heidegger. I got to page 21 and had to stop in complete disagreement with Harman. I thought, 'how can he misunderstand Being and TIme so fundamentally? - I remember asking Ray Brassier about this book 'tool being' -was it any good or completely wrong-headed? Anyway, i didn't read it again, as i thought it was thoroughly misguided in its claim that objects in themselves could be both present and ready to hand independently from Dasein (and other claims that all objects were also 'dasein').However, i have recently returned to it again. Harman makes a lot of sense, and he makes a lot of sense in a clear and lucid style - although there is a bit of repetition.The title `tool-being' is Harman's reconceptualising of Heidegger's `ready to hand' as the ontologically primary point of meaning of objects (ie their invisibility in use). However, Harman takes this notion and applies it directly to objects independently of dasein.Harman's book explores the single Heideggerian theme of present at hand and ready to hand. Traditionally, everything read as `present' is misread, bypassing temporality; whilst the `ready to hand' (typically the door know we use to open a door, or pen we use for writing, or oxygen we use to breath, etc) is invisible through its very habituated use. The ready to hand is the true ontological realm - as being invisible - as it is the mode in which `we' (dasein) most commonly interact with the world, untheoretically - if we start to inspect the door know/the pen/air we breath, then typically we break out of ready to hand mode, enter present at hand mode and are unable to open the door/write something/become conscious of how we breath, thereby entering the Cartesian mode of subject over against object/ becoming thematically aware of objects. Simply, the invisible realm of readiness to hand reveals the true `being' of objects, because it is what absorbs us most completely everyday and because anything deemed merely `present at hand' falls back upon the metaphysics of presence (ie that the essence of the thing present conceals a more fundamental realm beneath it).Harman reads Heidegger against the typical subjectivist readings by showing that both Zuhanderheit (ready to hand) and Vorhanderheit (present at hand = excuse the spellings) belong equally well to all entities and not merely objects 'encountered' by dasein - 'no humans need exist in order for the paper screen to resists dust or perish by fire' (p.34) - yet these objects still encounter each other in a meaningful way. what is so exciting about the speculative realist movement is this very idea that 'meaning' is not the sole reserve of us human beings - whilst Harman elaborates this lack of meaning in a playful way, Brassier pushes this towards a fascinating, though not a 'superficial' nihilism.Harman, along with other speculative realists, also seeks to undermine the 'relationality theory of reality' (p.23) by showing how objects have their own independent realityThe meaning of objects does not reside in their relations with dasein, as if objects are mere dead matter until brought to life through dasein's use. Neither is the meaning, the being, of objects in their relations , or `being-towards...' - no. the meaning of objects resides in the objects themselves. Handling and theorizing (Zuh...and Vorh..) are human centered (p.152). objects relate not just to human beings, but to each other (169). Whilst hammering a nail, the end of the hammer and the nail encounter one another as objects. Obviously there is no question here of either objects being consciously aware of each other. However, they do encounter each other in terms of present at hand and ready to hand entities. How? During this encounter, the fork of the hammer disappears into an unknown alien universe of its own, since it has become ready to hand to the nail (ie, is not encountering it, but is still part of the hammer). The point is, the fork does not disappear into its own usefulness (in the traditional Heideggerian reading) since it is not actually being used, it just disappears from its object. There is no dasein involved here - ie the hammer could have just fallen onto the hammer. In other words, every object is both singular and relational - so there IS such a thing an individual equipment. MOrever, every object is more than its mere relationality and its present at hand or readiness to hand: the object's being is beyond the reach of both dasein and other objects which it might encounter.Objects exist independently of dasein - and objects reduce each other to present at hand entities - it is not just dasein that does this. A billiard ball encounters another billiard ball, reducing the other ball to its pure mass (ball A is not interested in the colour of ball B for instance).Tool being is an easier read than Nihil Unbound, but not as vital as Meillasoux's ground-breaking Beyond Finitude. Harman's other book `The Quadruple object' reads as a simplified/summarized version of Tool Being - although I'm saying that having only got to page. 80 so far.There is only one negative I can find in tool being and that is that Harman does not leave himself enough room to fully outline his theory of objects in greater detail. I think he probably does go on to outline his object orientated philosophy in guerilla metaphysics.Excellent original reading of Heidegger.

Within a matter of pages it was clear that Harman had attacked a mirage of a problem.I'm sure some will call this a misreading of an apparent misreading of Being & Time. That's understandable given the rhetorical framing Harman creates. However the whole premise, as interesting as it is, is nevertheless based on an imagined oversight.Everything in Being & Time is knowingly from the perspective of Dasein. It's not that bridges have no being in relation to gulls, or that rocks cannot roll into rivers. Their 'independent' being is not questioned precisely because it is not a question for Dasein. Tool-Being and all it's observations on the totality of 'things' is itself the working of Dasein. It is not just a ground, it is the only starting point in which to claim non-Dasein significance. Heidegger does not neglect the being of things, but engages with them from the only view Dasein has available to it. Being is said precisely of Dasein as that which IS for Dasein itself...it is not a neglecting of the being of a snake, or a sheet of paper, but that just as the being of a snake cannot account in full for the being of paper, Dasein is immediately directed towards its own perspective (no matter how far reaching).All of this would be more forgivable if it wasn't for the arrogant tone running throughout this book. It's a tenuous position at best, but someone should tell Harman that unjustified patronising and false superiority really don't help to encourage a more favourable reception of what are at times very interesting and intelligent ideas. In 18 years of philosophical study this is without question the most unjustly smug book I have ever read.

This is dire. The author's gleeful and misguided conviction that only he of Heidegger's many readers has understood him given the dreck that fills every page makes it almost unreadable.