Bloody River: The Real Tragedy of the Rapido: 63 (Texas a & M University Military History Series) Paperback – Import, 30 September 1998

Very thin book. Most of it taken from an earlier work by the same writer. It gets the information across very well because the author is a very good Historian.But it is not a lengthy book less than 200 pages of very large writing,

Perhaps you've been swayed by Hollywood to think of the infamous last stand of General George Armstrong Custer's 7th Cavalry along the Little Big Horn River in Montana Territory on the morning of June 25, 1876 as the ultimate military fiasco suffered by the United States Army. Be prepared for a shock as you read Martin Blumenson's "Bloody River". His chilling account of World War II's tragically failed attempt by the US 36th Infantry Division to break through a German Panzer unit entrenched along the Rapido River in Italy on the morning of January 20, 1944 will dispel your "old west" illusions. Pressured by higher command to capture Rome prior to the Normandy invasion, Fifth Army General Mark Clark orders an ill-conceived attack by the 36th, a Texas National Guard outfit, with the intent of opening a path for an armored advance toward the Italian capital through the Liri Valley. Blumenson masterfully contrasts General Clark's single-mindedness with division commander Fred Walker's apprehension. Knowing from his experience in an almost identical situation in the First World War, Walker is certain his men are being committed to a doomed undertaking and is portrayed by the author as a man torn between duty and conscience. Blumenson's gut-wrenching account of the battle at the bloody river Rapido paints a vivid picture of a woefully executed plan that would cost nearly 1700 American casualties and lead to the survivors' post-war demand for a Congressional investigation. I was compelled to read "The Bloody River" cover to cover in one sitting, unable to find a break in the non-stop action that would permit me to lay it down until finished. - Review by John Zarro

The participants are now long gone. Blumenson was an excellent military historian. He was probably right about Walker's caution with the lives of his soldiers. However, it is not at all clear where and how he could have exerted more 'push' during the chaotic night attack on 20 January. The 21 January attacks were pure waste.

Mr Blumenson is a noted military historian whose books I've enjoyed but I take issue with this book. Though I didn't like the presentation or position taken by the author, it's a book that should be read by all interested in WWII or in war doctrine in general. Opening to the first page, the first indication of how this book will lean is staring at me. Its a quote from Sun Tzu from 500 BC from his book "On Art of War" that claims a commander can't have solicitude for his troops if he wants to win the war. Stalin and Hitler lived that sentiment and millions of thier soldiers died but, I believe, the US Army should not indulge in this reckless behavior unless its the very absolute last resort possible. And in the case of the Rapido assault, it wasn't the last resort, not even close to being the last resort, that General Clark had available to him. He had a number of options that involved either the British or the French but declined because he wanted to prove to the allies that had doubted his ability that he and his men could do the job. The theory behind Clark's actions and the premise of the book is: The sacrifice at Rapido was worth it to win the beachhead at Anzio. I don't accept it for the loss at Rapido was an absolute certainty while the successful landing at Anzio was still only a possibility. To make things worse, Clark never showed any remorse for his actions or poor planning that saw 2000 casualties. And the author condones and even congratulates Clark for the "courage" to make the tough call.Mr Blumenson, right from the first page, puts much of the blame on Walker and exonerates Clark from any wrong doing despite the fact the plan was Clark's and it was terrible. The author implies that despite fanatical German resistance if Walker had instilled greater confidence in his troops that the 36th ID should have established a working bridgehead on the far bank. The tactical facts just don't support that contention and the fact that it took months for the 5th Army to break through the Gustav line and reach Alban Hills should testify to Clark's poor plan. Churchill expected the 5th Army and Lucas's 6th Corps to meet up at the Alban Hills near the first of February. That shows how Churchill had no sense of reality to the Anzio plan he forced through channels.Walker isn't blameless. The author is correct that General Walker's pessimism was obvious and that he was lax in helping to coordinate and delineate the complex preparations between his infantry and the engineers who would have a major responsibility in rather the assault was successful. Despite the shortcomings, the American effort was substantial in the assault, but from the German side the effort appeared to be a probing attack; they didn't even have to call up reserves.The events in the coming months involving the Gustav Line-Anzio-Overlord-Dragoon scenario is a good example of many why the Italian campaign was a tactical as well as strategic mistake. And the mistake was exacerbated by the obsession of Churchill, Alexander and others to rush to liberate Rome. It caused many men to die needlessly.The tactical coverage was only a summary, not an in-depth presentation. It was just enough to show the confusion and difficulties of the 36th on the near shore, the difficult river crossing and the fanatical resistance of the enemy. I also noticed the artillery and aerial bombardment was inadequate for the operation but the author didn't make it relevant.When Eisnhower left the Med for Overlord, Alexander became CinC of the 15th Army Group which allowed Churchill to push through his agenda of the Anzio landing and a quick attempt to liberate Rome. It also gave General McCreery of X Corp the confidence of having Alexander back him up when he refused to take chances in support of the 36th ID on its right flank.The original objective for the Italian campaign was to tie down German forces in Italy and away from the French or Russian countryside; it wasn't necessary to rush for Rome for the original objective had been achieved. This whole Anzio saga was unnecessary, especially when it was interfering with Overlord and Dragoon. And when you consider the Anzio campaign was a failure, it makes the Rapido affair even more tragic.In Carlo D'Este's "Fatal Decision", he also points out the pessimism of Walker but puts the major blame on the arrogant and inexperienced Clark and his inexperienced planning staff to choose the worse section of the river to cross. The freezing river was nine feet deep with a current of 10 MPH and marshy banks that made it impossible for tanks to navigate. Plus there was absolutely no cover to approach the river and very little on the other side for the understrength, worn out division facing the experienced 15th PzGD who had all the advantages. Also in his book, Blumenson neglects to inform the reader that Clark offered the Rapido assault to 3rd ID but they instantly declined, saying it was a suicidal run.Read this book but let it not be your only read for it doesn't give a clear and complete picture. There is a large Bibliography in Carlo D'Este's book that could help further your reading and understanding of this terrible event.

Bloody River was first written in 1970 for the general commercial press, then re-published by the Texas A&M military history press in 1998. I purchased the 2008 second printing. I found Bloody River to be a well-written and a fast read, but a sparsely footnoted or referenced little book. Martin Blumenson has packed a lot of biographical and historical information into 135 short pages. There are only a few hand-drawn maps and some stock photos. The book is more similar to a historical study monograph than a full length historical work.Bloody River focuses as much on the personalities and the inter-personal conflicts between the senior leadership as the disastrous tactical battle itself. None of the senior leaders - Clark, Keyes, or Walker - come out of the battle looking very distinguished; in fact, they are all tarnished. Clark comes across as a vainglorious, self-serving, self-centered general looking to achieve his fourth star (which he did); Keyes, as corps commander, comes across as more of a toady and sycophant to Clark than a competent corps commander; and Walker, well, he fed his men directly into the meat grinder that was the poorly planned and poorly executed direct frontal assault on that part of the Gustav line along the Rapido River. And Walker's G-3 - the division plans and operations chief - was his own son, Lt. Col. Fred Walker, Jr. What's up with that nepotism? [While a second, younger son served as Walker's personal aide.]The Rapido River battle was conducted over a period of less than three days in mid-January 1944 and it was an absolute disaster for the U.S. Army. For that reason alone, it is worth the study. The difference between failure and disaster is a failure has, at least at the initial stage, a reasonable chance of success; a disaster is failure in the initial stage that is then compounded by adding on more failure. That was the Rapido River tactical battle - it never had a chance of success and 5th Army commander Mark Clark and corps commander Keyes surely knew this before the troops crossed the line of departure on January 20, 1944. It was a failure in the making, a failure in planning, and a failure in execution, and fundamentally, a wasteful loss of 1,700 soldiers serving with the 36th Division. Well-worth reading, even if the book is somewhat short and abbreviated.