The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War

Nicholas Thompson is the grandson of Paul Nitze and as such has reason and will to revisit the Cold War in a work published in 2009 when that period was easing into history, four years after the passing of the architect of ‘containment’ and five after the man who bragged “[Kennan] always thought that I hijacked our Cold War policy of containment away from him.” “And I did, of course,” Paul Nitze – the dove and the hawk.What they achieved was to shape the perceptions of the nation regarding the intentions of the Soviet Union, from the end of WWII to the demise of the U.S.S.R. in the early 1990’s, and those ideas formulated policy in a contest of devastating nuclear armaments. That both were, as Thompson shows, mistaken about Soviet policy mattered little as their net impact was the avoidance of WWIII by wise if often conflicting counsel. Thompson gift is to described the building of the Cold War contest, the broad interplay of ideology shaping capitalism versus communism as worthy of world destruction if need be and finally efforts to wind down the stockpiles of death against the parade of Washington leaders thrown up in the fifty year period.From Truman to Clinton, Stalin to Gorbachev. I had to battle the impulse to record passages on almost every page his telling is that rich.George Kennan and Paul Nitze come across as very wise men who disagreed because of a simple premise on what Russian History projected and what it meant for the conflict between two great powers; both men have been ruled brilliant but that did not resolve their dispute.Roll that failing into the current world’s perceived conflict between a rising China and a declining America, as some see it, and the rogue interplay injected by Putin’s Russia and Kim’s Korea and all the elements seem to be present for another Cold War, but where are the wise men?One could take from Nicholas Thompson rich history that the world was lucky last time, though not those who fell in Korea and Vietnam. If you remember the period you will greatly enjoy Thompson’s caring coverage.

The two men were giants. Every decision they made was based upon available facts and much uncertainty. They served their country well. The book should be read today. For example in 1969 Kissinger and Nixon cooked up a ploy . Nixon had B52s fly very close to the USSR for three days in an effort to convince the Soviets that Nixon was a mad man. The Soviets reacted with serious disarmament talks. One could guess then that Kissinger and Trump used a similar ploy in dealing with North Korea. The book, however, glosses over what was probably the onet important part Paul Nitze's life. Nitze was Secretary of the Navy when the Gulf of Tomkin incident occurred. It wast his duty to verify the field reports. He apparently did nothing. Many died as a result of his inaction.

The content of the book is great of course. The dust jacket was in good shape as well, as it was protected by the all too well known clear plastic of a public library. The hard back front cover was torn about a half inch, and that was not expected and does lesser the value of the product. Had I known the hardcover was torn I may have ordered another copy. As a reading copy it is great. As a collecting copy it is not so great.

This review was motivated partially by my conversations with Dr. R.H. I hope he finds it useful. The views and any errors are all mine.The Hawk and the Dove, by Nicholas Thompson, is a dual biography of two of America's leading strategists of the Cold War, George Kennan and Paul Nitze, both of whom I have admired for many years.I thoroughly enjoyed the book but learned very little from it. This seemingly contradictory comment is based on the following pros and cons.Pros:* The book is very well written. Thompson is editor of Wired magazine which has clearly honed his writing skills.* Thompson is also the grandson of Paul Nitze, one of the subjects of the dual biography. This family connection has obviously stimulated his interest in researching his subject.* Thompson has toed a very even line, providing a highly objective history of his grandfather's career.* Thompson's book provides a condensed version of Kennan's two volumeMemoirs, that are, sadly, out of print. He thereby makes this classic more readily available to the current-day reader.Cons:* The Hawk and the Dove draws very heavily on Kennan's two volume Memoirs and does not add much to the historical record for anyone who has read them. Although out of print, they are readily available through Amazom's used book network. See my reviews (which are more substantive in style than this one).* Thompson's style at times diverges from that of a serious historian. I'll cite two examples. First, the title, The Hawk and the Dove, greatly exagerates and simplifies the differences between the two men. I'll expand on this comment below. In fairness, this title may have been imposed on the author by his publisher as a strategy to increase sales. Second, Thompson includes several items that I can only characterize as unproven innuendo without historical significance: Did Kennan have an affair with a fellow internee while under German internment during WWII? Was Admiral Elmo Zumwalt's daughter trailed on the orders of some high government official? After William Sullivan of the FBI declared that one would "probably read about his death as some kind of accident but not to believe it. It would be murder", he was killed in a "hunting accident". Thompson does not substantiate any of these allegations.Reviewer's Comments* Kennan (the Dove) formulated the US policy of Containment which was the basis of US policy toward the Soviet Union for half a century. He advocated that the US enter the Korean War as the primary belligerent rather than as a contributor to a force sponsored by the UN. Over the years, his description of Containment morphed from (perhaps) equal parts of military and non-military pressure on the Soviets to one based primarily on non-military means. Nonetheless, he never lost sight of his original goal of containing Soviet expansion and never regarded the Soviet Union as anything other than an enemy. Not your typical "dove".* Nitze (the Hawk) was an early opponent of the Vietnam War. His attempts to reach an arms control agreement with the Soviets during the Reagan administration were initially rejected by that administration. Not your typical "hawk".* Rather than the Hawk and the Dove, I prefer to think of them as the Insider and the Outsider. Nitze (the Insider) served in every administration from Roosevelt through Reagan, except for Carter's. Nitze saw himself as more effective in influencing US policy as a member of government than as an outsider. And, he was.* Kennan (the Outsider) insisted, under every administration, on being his own man, even at the expense of his diplomatic career. He had a penchant for resigning, threatening to resign, or placing himself in situations where resignation might be the only honorable path. This isn't to say he wasn't justified in many of these actions. He just saw himself as more effective in influencing US policy if he was unencumbered by being forced to support the current administration's policies when he disagreed with them. And, he was.* Kennan and Nitze were both patriotic Americans. Both were dedicated to the same goals: (1) Defending the West from the Soviet menace and (2) Defeating communism at the least cost to the West. Their differences were about tactics and strategies, not about goals. I wish we had two such strategists guiding US policies today.Recommendations for those interested in reading more about the history of the Cold War:* Strategies of Containment by John Lewis Gaddis is the best overall history of the evolution and ultimate success of containment.* Kennan's two volume Memoirs covers most of the substantive content of The Hawk and the Dove in more depth and in an elegant style.* If you still want more after reading the above, scan through my Amazon book reviews. About half of them deal with diplomacy and history.

Der Kalte Krieg, dessen Ende mit der Auflösung der Sowjetunion vor zwanzig Jahren besiegelt wurde, ist für viele Zeitgenossen heute kaum noch eine Erinnerung wert. Dabei war er für alle, welche die achtziger Jahre des letzten Jahrhunderts noch bewusst erlebt haben, einst omnipräsent gewesen.Der amerikanische Journalist Nicholas Thompson ruft uns diese vergangene Epoche wieder in Erinnerung. In seinem Buch stehen zwei führende Protagonisten des Kalten Krieges im Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung, die den Ost-West-Konflikt von Anfang an mitgestaltet und durchlebt haben. George Kennan und Paul Nitze waren hierbei sowohl Partner als auch Rivalen, die beide versuchten, einen prägenden Einfluss auf die Gestaltung der amerikanischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik auszuüben. Inwieweit sie damit Erfolg hatten, untersucht Thompson in seiner Arbeit, die für ihn auch eine familiäre Dimension aufweist, war Paul Nitze doch sein Großvater.Für George Kennan begann der Kalte Krieg im Zentrum der Gegenseite. Als Diplomat verbrachte er das Kriegsende 1945 in Moskau, wo er die totalitäre Herrschaft von Josef Stalin hautnah miterlebte. Im Gegensatz zu seinen Vorgesetzten in Washington machte sich Kennan keine Illusionen über die Natur der sowjetischen Außenpolitik, die an einer echten Kooperation mit den Vereinigten Staaten nicht interessiert war. Er forderte frühzeitig eine politische Eindämmung der sowjetischen Ambitionen, die schließlich auch von Außenminister Marshall und Präsident Truman durchgesetzt wurde.Die Umsetzung der Eindämmungsstrategie erfolgte allerdings in einer Weise, die Kennan zunehmend befremdete. An die Stelle einer politischen und wirtschaftlichen Konzeption trat immer stärker eine militärische, welche die ursprüngliche Intension der Eindämmung letztlich verdrängte. Mitverantwortlich für diese Entwicklung, die Kennan nicht verhindern konnte, war Paul Nitze. Dieser hatte maßgeblich die strategische Richtlinie NSC 68 formuliert, welche darauf abzielte, die sowjetische Herausforderung militärisch in Schach zu halten.Die Differenzen zwischen Kennan und Nitze zeigten sich ebenfalls bei der Entwicklung der Kernfusionsbombe. Kennan war strikt gegen die Herstellung solcher Massenvernichtungswaffen, während Nitze sich dafür einsetzte.Nachdem Kennan klar wurde, dass er innerhalb des diplomatischen Dienstes nichts mehr in seinem Sinne bewegen konnte, wechselte er im Verlauf der fünfziger Jahre in die Geschichtswissenschaft und Publizistik. Er wurde zu einem prominenten Außenseiter, der meistens der Regierungspolitik seines Heimatlandes skeptisch bis ablehnend gegenüberstand.Hierin unterschied er sich grundlegend von Nitze, der bis ins hohe Alter hinein den verschiedensten Administrationen in den unterschiedlichsten Positionen angehörte. Nitze war der geborene Insider, der es wie kein Zweiter verstand, sich mit seinem Wissen und seinen Erfahrungen in die jeweilige Regierungspraxis einzubringen. Dies reichte von seiner Tätigkeit als Direktor des Politischen Planungsstabes im Außenministerium, wo er in die direkten Fußstapfen von Kennan trat, bis hin zu seinem Wirken als Abrüstungsexperte unter Präsident Ronald Reagan.Nicholas Thompson bemüht sich dabei durchgängig, die Lebensgeschichten seiner beiden Hauptdarsteller in den breiteren Kontext des Kalten Krieges einzufügen. Dies gelingt ihm allerdings nur teilweise. Für die zweite Hälfte der vierziger Jahre bis zum Ende der sechziger Jahre ist es ihm weitgehend geglückt. Für die siebziger Jahre und die erste Hälfte der achtziger Jahre kann man dies leider nicht mehr sagen. Hier begeht Thompson den groben Fehler, dass er die Außenpolitik der Supermächte mit Hilfe von Aussagen sowjetischer Zeitzeugen bewertet, ohne dass er in der Lage wäre, diese Aussagen anhand von sowjetischem Archivmaterial auf ihre Richtigkeit hin abzuklären. So entsteht ein einseitig verzerrtes Bild, welches zwangsläufig dazu führt, dass Thompson den außenpolitischen Einschätzungen von Kennan positiver begegnet als denen von Nitze. Dieser hatte jedoch für seine harte Haltung gute Gründe, wenn man sich die sowjetische Stationierung von Mittelstreckenraketen in Europa und den Einmarsch der Roten Armee in Afghanistan vor Augen führt.Der Autor würdigt Nitze dann wieder für seine Abrüstungsbemühungen in den achtziger Jahren. Hierbei konzentriert er sich aber auf die gescheiterten Gespräche in Island, während er die erfolgreichen Verhandlungen zur Beseitigung der Mittelstreckenraketen nur kurz erläutert.Als Fazit bleibt festzuhalten, dass das Buch von Thompson die berufliche und intellektuelle Entwicklung von Kennan und Nitze gut herausarbeitet. Er verwendet eine Vielzahl von Quellen und Aufzeichnungen, die seine diesbezüglichen Ausführungen in einem überzeugenden Licht erscheinen lassen. Die Verknüpfung mit der Geschichte des Kalten Krieges ist ihm weniger gut gelungen. Der Leser sollte hierzu andere Werke heranziehen, wie beispielsweise "The Cold War: A New History“ von John Lewis Gaddis.Jürgen Rupp

As a history of the Cold War, this book is not just a bit superficial, but as a study of Kennan's and Nitze's professional lives as political advisors and/or officials it is very good. The author often uses the pronoun we or us when referring to America which suggests that he did not have a non-american community of readers in mind when he was writing this book. But the book is in my opinion almost perfectly comprehensible without any deeper knowledge of American history. All in all I found the book interesting, readable and informative.

The author writes with skill and insight. The skill is his own; a part of the insight comes with being Paul Nitze's grandson. Required reading for students of the Cold War.

All Good

NitzeとKennanは、これまで読んだアメリカ外交史関連の本には必ずでてきていたのに、いまひとつ捉えどころのない二人でしたが、この本を読んですっきりしました。冷戦時のソ連に対するcontainmentの入門書としてもお薦めです。