Truth: Ideas in Profile

This is Simon Blackburn’s third book with the same title. The first, in 1999, was a collection of essays and excerpts from major works by well-known philosopher like Frege, Dummet, Austin, and Strawson. The second in 2005, was a ‘guide’ on this important but elusive subject, written solely by Blackburn. It remains an extremely informative and clear book. Blackburn explains why he has written this third book. He says that he had criticized much of the philosophical views of everyone who has a thing to say about ‘Truth’ in his second book, and now feels compelled to do greater justice to the reasons why there has been so much disagreement. This is a much smaller book than the previous two. Here Blackburn sets out in a brief form the main philosophical explanations of truth. He begins with the ‘correspondence theory’ which has a s simplistic definition that appeals to many lay people but universally disdained by ‘truth-seeking’ philosophers. So much so that Peter Strawson says that that theory ‘requires not purification, but elimination’. In brief, the theory proposes that truth is when belief corresponds with fact. Fair enough, but unfortunately, philosophers are quick to point out that belief and fact are established by the individual in exactly the same way. It may be said, therefore, that this theory is far too self-serving to be of any use. Blackburn then goes on to the slightly improved, but still muddled ‘coherence theory’ which still tries to reconcile ‘beliefs over here’ with ‘facts over there’, but an objective unifier is hard to find, leading this theory very much in the hands of religious people who impose ‘God’ as the unifier that coheres beliefs with facts. He goes on to discuss pragmatism, deflationism, as well as the semantic theory of truth. Each of those theories have impressive points but ultimately falls short of a definitive answer as to what truth is and how it is known. Given the areas in which there can be disagreements about the definition and nature of truth, Blackburn then explores specific areas in which these disagreements meet. He begins the second part of the book discussing taste and art and why they cannot admit truth. As the old maxim has it, ‘tastes are not to be disputed’. Referring back to some of the established theories, Blackburn suggests that there may be room for truth even in taste and art, even in instances where, for example, he says that Beethoven is a better composer than Bernstein, and someone else agrees. He builds an argument that where experts agree, some kernel of truth might lie in the core of that agreement. Blackburn also discusses the element of objectivity in ethics, and the application of reason in truth-seeking. In 119 pages, Blackburn has not so much presented a new theory but he has given a refresher to his previous book, with fresh perspectives. As always, Blackburn is an extremely lucid writer and whatever else the reader might think of this book, he will enjoy reading it – that’s the truth.

This is Simon Blackburn’s third book with the same title. The first, in 1999, was a collection of essays and excerpts from major works by well-known philosopher like Frege, Dummet, Austin, and Strawson. The second in 2005, was a ‘guide’ on this important but elusive subject, written solely by Blackburn. It remains an extremely informative and clear book. Blackburn explains why he has written this third book. He says that he had criticized much of the philosophical views of everyone who has a thing to say about ‘Truth’ in his second book, and now feels compelled to do greater justice to the reasons why there has been so much disagreement. This is a much smaller book than the previous two. Here Blackburn sets out in a brief form the main philosophical explanations of truth. He begins with the ‘correspondence theory’ which has a s simplistic definition that appeals to many lay people but universally disdained by ‘truth-seeking’ philosophers. So much so that Peter Strawson says that that theory ‘requires not purification, but elimination’. In brief, the theory proposes that truth is when belief corresponds with fact. Fair enough, but unfortunately, philosophers are quick to point out that belief and fact are established by the individual in exactly the same way. It may be said, therefore, that this theory is far too self-serving to be of any use. Blackburn then goes on to the slightly improved, but still muddled ‘coherence theory’ which still tries to reconcile ‘beliefs over here’ with ‘facts over there’, but an objective unifier is hard to find, leading this theory very much in the hands of religious people who impose ‘God’ as the unifier that coheres beliefs with facts. He goes on to discuss pragmatism, deflationism, as well as the semantic theory of truth. Each of those theories have impressive points but ultimately falls short of a definitive answer as to what truth is and how it is known. Given the areas in which there can be disagreements about the definition and nature of truth, Blackburn then explores specific areas in which these disagreements meet. He begins the second part of the book discussing taste and art and why they cannot admit truth. As the old maxim has it, ‘tastes are not to be disputed’. Referring back to some of the established theories, Blackburn suggests that there may be room for truth even in taste and art, even in instances where, for example, he says that Beethoven is a better composer than Bernstein, and someone else agrees. He builds an argument that where experts agree, some kernel of truth might lie in the core of that agreement. Blackburn also discusses the element of objectivity in ethics, and the application of reason in truth-seeking. In 119 pages, Blackburn has not so much presented a new theory but he has given a refresher to his previous book, with fresh perspectives. As always, Blackburn is an extremely lucid writer and whatever else the reader might think of this book, he will enjoy reading it – that’s the truth.