Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East

There is a growing movement amongst those who study the Eastern Front to recognize that not only was it by far the most important theater in WW2, but that it's outcome was largely determined in 1941. To many, this might come as a surprise, given the emphasis on D-Day and its role in defeating the Germans. But well before then, well before even famous Stalingrad or Kursk, the German Wehrmacht was in serious trouble. Stahel outlines in this excellent book that this was apparent even during what is perhaps the most successful battle in history- the Battle for Kiev. Hundreds of thousands of Soviets were killed or captured during this battle. It would be a defeat that few militaries could withstand, yet the Soviets not only withstood it, they were able to make it a Pyrrhic victory for the Germans.The book largely focuses on the German side of the conflict. Perhaps understandably, as there isn't as much to say about the static defensive strategies of the Soviets other than Stalin was his own worst enemy. Time and again his generals pleaded to be allowed to save their troops by withdrawing from the obviously precarious situation. Even with the Germans moving at a relative snail's pace, Stalin's stubbornness was solid and he allowed multiple Soviet armies to be encircled and annihilated. There are additional Soviet perspectives offered to give an idea of what was happening on the tactical scale, largely relating to the brutality of the conflict and the casualties being inflicted on both sides.Those casualties were crucial and cast a great shadow over Germany's chances in the East. The book discusses in some depth the conflict amongst the German generals and Hitler who fought each other and amongst themselves over the correct course of actions. Removing the isolated Soviet armies to the Southwest or driving straight to Moscow. Many people, including myself, thought that the delay in driving to Moscow was perhaps the fatal decision in Operation Barbarossa. While this book does not discuss the drive to Moscow in any depth (I've read others that have), it does illustrate how unlikely such a drive would have been. In essence, Germany had burned up much of its motorized capabilities during its early dash into Soviet territory. As machines were used for months without rest, as spare parts and replacements became fewer and farther away, the capability of the Wehrmacht for mobile action (its hallmark) became seriously limited. Soviet terrain, poor roads, limited rail, and terrible weather all compounded the problem, as did early saboteurs. The ignorance or overoptimism of the German high command (including Hitler) regarding their logistical situation was shocking. Only Goebbels seem to grasp the implications of the early losses. Which were not only limited to material. Men were dying far faster than they could be replaced. Combined, this greatly reduced the strength of almost all German groups. Thus, while they appeared to be strong on paper, in reality they were operating at 1/3 to 2/3 strength in most instances. The same is often true for the Luftwaffe. Overall, it paints a very bleak picture of the odds of Germany ever succeeding in beating the Soviets. As I've said elsewhere, I think their only hope lay in panicking Stalin into a deal or a surrender early on. When that failed to happen, the war turned into a war of attrition that had only one possible outcome (even without Allied intervention or Lend-Lease).The book also explores the relationship between various commanders, especially Guderian and his superiors. Guderian comes off as arrogant, insubordinate, driven, capable, and whining. It's hard to know if he was a good guy or a bad guy in terms of helping the overall cause, but he did lead to the single greatest victory that Germany ever obtained in WW2. But, as has been said, that was not enough. The Soviets could take their massive losses more than the Germans could take their lesser, but still heavy losses.All in all then, this makes for an excellent read. It is interspersed with comments from foot soldiers on both sides who offer a more human view of the grand battle(s) taking place. Combined with the subject matter, the serious depth of references, and an engaging writing style, I think this is one book that anyone interested in WW2 or military history should pick up and read. Highly recommended.

It surprises me that historians cover very little of the battle of Kiev. It is, arguably, the German's greatest victory and deserves to be studied. Stahel's book is well-paced, interesting and balanced. Its been one-year since I read the book and is still in my mind today (which is actually why I'm writing a review about it).The book should get its praises and deserves to be read.Loved it and will be purchasing "Operation Typhoon" by the same author.Shc

Every book I have read of Stahels has been a pleasure. Well written with great maps supplied by Glantz.Anything released by Cambridge University Press is of high quality. I understand its an arduous process toget a work published by them. They have very high standards..Well done Mr. Stahel.

A masterpiece. Stahel is amazing.

Undoubtedly, Mr. Stahel's book is probably the best recent summary of Kiev encirclement for those interested on Eastern Front operations. Comparing with the author's first book, this one it is far better organized and argumentative. It is informative, gripping and the text is solid and well supported with arguments and maps.The book starts with a short and interesting introduction that presents what to expect from the book.Personally, I expected that the first chapter would describe AGS Order of battle (ORBAT) or its early operations (frontier battles), but I found, instead, a summary of the UK and US's supporting roles to the Soviet war economy, coupled with useful accounts about the Soviet war effort in 1941.In the first half of the second chapter the author made a good point by stressing the importance of economic dimension of this conflict. The author showed that prior to the invasion of Russia, German industry mirrored the blitzkrieg style of war. Even in the full war and with enemies, the Germans neglected to initiate all-out war production (which started too late-in 1943). Instead, German military factories produced relatively modest amounts of first one weapon, then another, in response to the various needs of several campaigns (Britain, Atlantic etc). Barely noticeable at the beginning of Barbarossa, this faulty strategy will prove disastrous later on.The last part of the second chapter eventually introduced us to the early operations of the AGS.Although I did not find an ORBAT for AGS or its opponent - South Western Front - I was able to discover the division/corps's actions/movements since the narrative is well supported by 5 very good maps. But I wanted some (deep) explanations about the slower advance of Rundstedt's troops (comparing to other two AGs), some of them dating back from the early planning of Barbarossa.In my opinion, AGS was least well-prepared and had the most difficult mission (taking into account the size of the enemy, the huge size of the area of operations, etc). Originally, I think Hitler had planned a double envelopment converging on the Kiev area, but in mid-march 1941 he decided that the AGS should mass its strength on the left in an advance towards Kiev. This decision was sound because AGS had only 5 armored divisions (9, 11, 13, 14 and 16) and even these were a bit worn from the Balkan campaign. I believe that the presence of a second Panzer Group was the key for a devastating success in AGS area of operations. The second Panzer Group could penetrate easily the Soviet formations in Moldova and could continue its march towards Kiev from a SE direction, surrounding the enemy units located near the Polish-Soviet border. The problem is there were no other German Panzer units available to form this steel fist; two Panzer divs. were in Africa (15 and 21) and the last two (2 and 5) were in general reserve, refitting after Balkans campaign. Moreover, the presence of this second panzer arm would make no deviation from Moscow, as objective. Even later in war, the vast featureless ground in the Ukraine required the presence of two Panzer armies (1 and 4), since it was ideal for tank maneuvers.On the other side, the Soviets had deployed their strongest formations in the Ukraine, expecting that a potential invader would concentrate his effort there. This planned Soviet strategy was sound for several reasons. First, industry was concentrated in the bend of the Donets River, much as the bulk of the German industry was concentrated in the Rhine region (60% of Russia's coal and 30% of her iron came from this rich region). In addition, an invasion of the Ukraine could cut Russia off from the great oil fields on the Caspian Sea, which then 70% of the country's oil.To make the situation worse, the majority of the Ukrainians chafed under Soviet rule and might help the invader. Finally, the wide, often featureless Ukrainian plain is the best tank country in European Russia. For all these reasons, the Russians were justified in thinking the Germans would make their main effort in the Ukraine.Some time ago I read Kamenir's book "Bloody Triangle", a really interesting analysis about a massive tank clash in the Lutsk-Dubno-Brody triangle between Soviet Kiev Special Military District and 5 Panzer Divs.(no doubt, Kleist's Panzer Gp.) and additional 13 German formations. Unfortunately, this battle, clearly in AGS area of operations, was not covered in this book.On page 93 the author made a short introduction of Germany's allies who operated under AGS, particularly Romanian armies. He shows the strengths, weaknesses and the leadership of these allies and described accurately their main battles, particularly the Romanian 4 Army siege of Odessa (august-October), one of the Soviet Union's first "Hero Cities" (alongside with Moscow, Leningrad and Stalingrad), and the only one who fell to Axis forces."The road to Kiev", book's third chapter, is an interesting account about the battle for decisions to initiate this maneuver instead of continuing the advance directly to Moscow. Chapter 4 continues the debates and shows the situation of Pz.Gp. 2 as the operation commenced on August 25. Logistical problems, Axis allies limited capabilities, AGS overextension etc are carefully scrutinized by the author. Chapters 5 and 6 depicted the battle for Kiev closing the ring and the final battles of the Soviet remnants.I noted a paragraph with the death of General E. Schobert (CO of 11 Army) on page 234, but surprisingly, I didn't see mentioned the appointment of General Erich von Manstein as his replacement! In fact von Manstein is barely mentioned in the whole book.Chapter 8 shows a rapid movement of the author's narrative in the Leningrad area, coupled with a short analysis of the Hitler's triumph in the Ukraine.The last two chapters are dedicated to the preparation for the "Operation Typhoon" the last German attempt to take Moscow. To be honest, I expected from the author to continue his "advance" with the subsequent battles of AGS. Again very good and accurate accounts about Germany's allies (page 314-316).In a 9-page Conclusion chapter Mr. Stahel is trying to establish the importance of the Kiev battle and also the critical decisions which led to this German victory, achieved with depleted German units. As throughout the book, the author tries to answer to an obvious question - Did Hitler make a serious error by detaching the Second Army and Second Panzer Group to assist AGS in the Kiev encirclement? In many books, this question has much been debated.I personally believe that if Hitler had listened to his generals and continued toward Moscow, the city would have fallen, but certainly the Soviets would continue the war. Even in possession of Moscow, the Germans would still have been overextended and exposed in winter of 41-42. Because Moscow presented a definite objective within striking distance which the Soviets forces had to defend, the German generals were right to prefer it, but Germany was not likely to end the war in 1941, whatever strategy was adopted.Eventually, I think that the Hitler's disastrous decision was to continue the advance on Moscow during November 1941, but the German generals concurred to it, despite some misgivings.Strangely enough, Hitler deserves the full credit for the Kiev victory (as the author mentioned in his book), but not the full blame for continuing the Moscow offensive after the bad weather had broken.Obviously, if no diversion had been made, AGC could have renewed its advance towards Moscow in mid-August rather than the end of September. Had AGC continued to advance on Moscow in August, the Russians would have lost their capital before December. But I believe they would not have surrendered. (as Mr Stahel mentioned by the end of the year 1941, Red army still possessed an estimated 8 million men!)However, without Moscow as a starting base, the Russians could not have launched such a powerful winter offensive against AGC. On the other hand, I considered that Hitler was probably right in preferring to seize the Donets region and interdict the Russian supply of Caucasus oil. Certainly the Donets industry was more important to the Soviet war effort than was Soviet capital.As Mr. Stahel correctly pointed out, the German strategy was faulty, as the decisions were taken too late and afterwards their leadership failed to carry out them out.Going back to the book, there are 21 good B&W photos, but I personally consider that adding more could be better. At least one of them (p. 195, partisans' executions) I consider it useless from historical point of view. (There was also in the first book one useless photo, with public hangings on page 351). The 13 maps are very good, accurately from military point of view, and that really support the narrative; three of them (4, 5 and 13) are very large, on double page, depicting larger unit maneuvers/movements.I must mentioned that some of the German soldier's memories are hair-raising (page 129, 197, 234 etc).Overall, a good book with interesting accounts, strategic debates and accurate conclusion.In conclusion, "Kiev 1941" is very good piece of analysis and by far the most complete narrative of a critical WW II operation. Well recommended.