Admiral "Bull" Halsey: The Life and Wars of the Navy's Most Controversial Commander

The delivery of the author's tone, voice and enthusiasm of his writing of "Admiral 'Bull' Halsey" only heightened the excitement of this read. The novel is complete with amazing and accurate depictions of Halsey's life and Navel career. The insight towards Halsey's military decisions and the portrayal of his character all are aligned with what I already knew of the man from previous readings. The novel is excellent for any history buff but more importantly, it's a pretty cool book for today's youth who want to experience how life at sea really was diring WWII. I only wish I could have met the man and worked under his leadership. What an American inspiration he was!Michael Collins,Fountain Valley, California

this is the story of one of the great military men of our times,the author has brought to life the man and his times

I'm looking forward to reading this book.Admiral Halsey was one of the architect of the defeat of Japan in The Second World War.

Great book, a good look at a figure from history

Review of Admiral "Bull" Halsey by John Wukovits, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.Readers of this review are doubtless familiar with the broad outlines of Halsey's career so we need only a cursory review of the big picture.Halsey graduated from the Naval Academy in 1904 with a distinguished athletic record and a rather mediocre academic record. He specialized in destroyers for a good part of his early career. He spent time at both the Naval War College and the Army equivalent in the 1930s. Slated to become CO of the carrier Saratoga, he insisted on taking the full naval aviator training course at Pensacola.On December 7, 1941 Halsey was at sea on Enterprise, missing the attack on Pearl Harbor. In the immediate aftermath of the attack he was put in charge of all the seaborne ships in the area. Subsequently in charge of a carrier task force he lead successful raids on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands, and then was in overall command of the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo.Forced into the hospital with a skin disease prior to the Battle of Midway Halsey convinced Chester Nimitz to name Raymond Spruance commander of his task force even though Spruance was not an aviator. The result, with a little help from Joe Rochefort, was the stunning American victory at Midway.In October of 1942 Halsey relieved Robert L. Ghormley as overall commander of the stalled Guadalcanal campaign, and commander of the South Pacific Area. He remained in the South Pacific until 1944, having culminated his campaign by isolating and neutralizing the Japanese fortress of Rabaul.Taking over command of the Third Fleet in the Central Pacific Area he was in charge of the main westward thrust of the USN until January of 1945. It was during this time, at the Battle of Leyte, October, 1944, that his most controversial decisions were made.Halsey turned over command of Third Fleet to Ray Spruance in January of 1945 when it became Fifth Fleet. He resumed command in late May of '45, and remained in command until the end of the war, witnessing the Japanese surrender on the deck of his flagship, the battleship Missouri.Halsey was promoted to the five-star rank of Fleet Admiral in December of 1945, the last US naval officer to attain that rank. He retired in 1947, and died in 1959.Wukovits' book gets into considerably more detail on all the above topics. The prose is lucid and the topics flow well together.Details aside, there are several themes that Wukovits emphasizes. One main point is the extent to which Halsey emerged as a national hero in the wake of Pearl Harbor. He spends a fair amount of space relating press coverage that Halsey received for the Marshal and Gilbert raids, and, eventually, the Doolittle Raid. To a nation that had been clobbered at Pearl Harbor, Halsey's aggressive stance seemed like a ray of hope. More highly positive press coverage resulted from the Guadalcanal/South Pacific campaigns- all thoroughly justified. Halsey was far and away the most well known and respected naval officer in service at the time. Wukovits several times makes the point that Halsey and George Patton were pretty much coequal in the eyes of the American public.A seeming minor incident, but with long range consequences, is another point that Wukovits makes. Shortly after Chester Nimitz took over as CINCPAC he outlined, at a staff and commanders meeting, a fairly aggressive plan to strike back at the Japanese. The staff, mostly holdovers from Husband Kimmel's time, were dubious and rather negative. Halsey strongly supported Nimitz's approach in fairly bombastic terms. He and Nimitz carried the day. From that day onward Nimitz felt that he owed Halsey.Nimitz, as a young officer, had also witnessed the turmoil created in the Navy by the Sampson-Schley dispute in the aftermath of the war of 1898. He was determined that nothing similar would happen on his watch.Wukovits maintains that by essentially driving a desk during the South Pacific campaign Halsey was somewhat behind the power curve when he took over third fleet in 1944. He also makes the point that Halsey had been very frustrated by not finding the Japanese fleet immediately after Pearl Harbor, and even more frustrated by missing Midway. By the time he assumed command of Third Fleet he was borderline obsessed with bringing the Japanese fleet to a Mahanian decisive battle. This, Wukovits maintains, led to Halsey's controversial decisions at the Battle of Leyte.Halsey, in his quest to destroy Japanese carriers, allowed himself to be lured way from guarding a crucial area from which elements of the Japanese fleet could descend upon General MacArthur's landing force on the Philippines. There were several contributing causes to the decision. Chester Nimitz, upon whom Wukovits places a fair amount of blame, had, in addendum to the general orders covering the campaign, essentially given Halsey free rein to go after the Japanese fleet if the opportunity arose. Command and control at Leyte was divided, and the lines of communication were convoluted, at best. Both Halsey and Thomas Kinkaid, the 7th fleet commander made some erroneous assumptions about who was doing what to whom.The upshot was that Halsey took everything, including his fast battleships, north in pursuit of the Japanese carriers who were, by Japanese plan, deliberately placed to accomplish exactly this result. The San Bernadino Straits were left uncovered, Takeo Kurita's surface forces came through and started wreaking havoc upon the rather slender defensive force of the 7th fleet. The magnificent defense mounted by 7th fleet, particularly Admiral "Ziggy" Sprague's Taffy 3 eventually convinced Kurita that his effort was going nowhere and he turned his fleet around.In the meantime messages, including a fateful one from Nimitz, were arriving at Halsey's flagship. Halsey eventually turned his fleet south, although his aircraft had succeeded in sinking most of the decoy force, by the time he got back to Leyte, Kurita was long gone.Halsey's run to the north was violently controversial. 7th fleet felt abandoned, with some justification. Neither Nimitz nor Ernie King, Chief of Naval Operations, were pleased with Halsey's decision. In the end Nimitz, in particular, defended Halsey, largely because of Halsey's early support, and his (Nimitz's) desire to avoid another Sampson-Schley controversy. King was astute enough to realize that Halsey was the foremost Naval hero to the American public, and sacking him was probably not a good idea.Subsequent to Leyte, Halsey came under criticism for his handling of the fleet during two typhoons. Given the state of weather prediction at the time, and the conflicting advice he was getting, this all seems a trifle unfair. There were courts of inquiry, and the second one recommended that Halsey be relieved, but for the reasons outlined above Nimitz demurred.Wukovits gives Halsey major credit for a number of things. His advocacy of Spruance for command prior to Midway when Spruance was far from an obvious candidate. The whole Guadalcanal/South Pacific campaign would doubtless not have come out as it did with anybody but Halsey in command. Halsey's recommendation for an earlier invasion of the Philippines was a brilliant strategic move. Wukovits dings Halsey, with some modification, over the Leyte decision. As mentioned above Nimitz comes in for some criticism for the memo, and not realizing that Halsey was going to be Halsey, and given the choice between guarding a strait and sinking carriers, guess which was going to win? That being said, leaving San Bernadino unguarded, regardless of the reason, was not the best decision ever. Further, Wukovits argues that Halsey, deep in his heart, knew it was a bad decision, hence is extremely defensive reaction to criticism in later years.While this reviewer thinks the big picture of Halsey and his battles is very well done, the book suffers from a number of examples of either sloppy writing, a lack of fact checking, or editorial oversight. The ones that I caught include the following:Page 16: "Japanese battleship Mikassar - misspelling of Mikasa.Page 48- Draemel in command of TF2 immediately after Pearl Harbor, containing "battleships and destroyers" - no battleships there- all at the bottom of PH.Page 51. Technically Utah was no longer a battleship- small point.Page 74- cruiser Nashville with 15" guns. Nashville was a light cruiser with 6" guns.Somewhere "knots per hour," - a redundancy.Page 182- Yamato and Musashi "world's two newest...battleships" - Newest Japanese battleships, but the USN Iowa class were newer by two years.Page 217- "New Jersey was constructed to withstand strikes from 5-inch shells..." but was being rolled around by the typhoon. One certainly hopes she would withstand 5-inch shells. In fact she was designed to withstand 16" shells.Furthermore the index is pathetic. Nashville, mentioned twice in the text, has no entry, nor do Yamato and Musashi. This is probably more the doing of the publisher than Wukovits, but the point remains.Still, overall this is an excellent look at Halsey, neither hagiography nor basically negative. Recommended reading.